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TIE HYPOTHETICAL AS A TOOL FOR
TEACHING THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
Kathryn W Tate*
As one who instructs law students in the whys and wherefores of
the legal profession's ethical standards and lawyering skills,' I found
myself considering this hypothetical as a teaching tool. The hypothet-
ical presents a'particularly outrageous scenario-pitting one person's
life and liberty against another's. As such, it presents a classic
contrast between the profession's ethical rules on confidentiality and
one's own values or morality. The hypothetical would thus be useful
for teaching because it puts into clear focus the choice the profession
has made in crafting a confidentiality rule covering a confidence of
this type But exploring the lawyer's duty of confidentiality in the
hypothetical is just the beginning of examining the duty generally.
The hypothetical could be a vehicle to introduce the law student to
the policy considerations that undergird all facets of the model
confidentiality rule proposed by the American Bar Association
(ABA)? And it would allow discussion about the effect on the
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., George Williams College,
1960; J.D., University of Arizona, 1976. I would like to thank my colleagues Laurie L.
Levenson and David W. Burcham for their review and comments on an earlier draft, and
my research assistant William Niu for his invaluable help.
1. Besides business law subjects, I teach one section of Loyola's required Ethics,
Counseling, and Negotiation course which teaches the legal profession's ethical rules in the
context of the students also learning lawyering skills of interviewing, counseling, and
negotiation.
2. Other useful hypotheticals are based on the facts underlying People v. Beige, 372
N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975) (stating that although the murder defendant
admitted to three other murders in discussions with his attorneys Frank Armani and
Francis Beige, and although the attorneys visited the murder scene and confirmed the
presence of bodies, their nondisclosure of their knowledge of the prior murders and
location of the bodies was proper), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976), and cases like Estate
of D'Alessio v. Gilberg, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484 (App. Div. 1994) (denying application of
executor for hit-and-run victim to compel attorney to reveal name of client who may have
been hit-and-run driver because client's identity was privileged communication).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCt Rule 1.6 (1994) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. For the pertinent text of Model Rule 1.6, see infra note 10 and text
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lawyer's role toward the client and within the judicial system given the
variety of ethical rules on confidentiality in the various jurisdictions
that allow-and sometimes require-the lawyer to reveal the
confidences of a client.
As I approached writing this Essay and answering the question
the hypothetical presents, I felt as a teacher that I must start by fully
examining what the ethical rules do require. This would be the same
approach I would take as a lawyer to meet the requirement that I be
competent, meaning that I have the "legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the [situation]."4 I
knew generally the many variations of a lawyer's duty of confid-
entiality that had developed across the country, but I had never felt
the need to study them in detail. Now, to meet my competency
mandate, I felt the need to do so, and then after doing that research,
I felt its perspective would be useful to the Symposium. Here then,
is what I learned and my reactions to it that informed my response to
the hypothetical's question.
"A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that
the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the
representation."5 A client's confidences receive protection in two
ways: the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and the lawyer's ethical
duty. While the two protections overlap, the focus of this essay is
on the latter obligation, which the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules) define as follows: "A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
accompanying note 7.
4. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
5. Id. Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 4.
6. The drafters of the Model Rules described the difference between the attorney-
client privilege and the ethical duty:
The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which
a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence
concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations
other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion
of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source.
Id. Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 5; see X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1304-08 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(providing a detailed description of the two confidentiality standards), aff'd sub nom.
Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994).
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authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b)."7 The purpose of the duty of confidentiality
is to encourage clients to confide fully in their lawyers so that the
lawyers will be in the best position both to represent their clients and
to give them the best advice The concept of confidentiality is also
viewed as central to an attorney-client relationship which enhances
client autonomy and gives the client assurance that the legal system
is fair.9
The statement of a lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality seems
simple; its purpose laudatory. Yet, the hypothetical for this Sympo-
sium sets out certain facts-a client who has confessed to murder
where another person has been convicted of that crime and faces
execution-and then asks: What should the public defender do?,
implying that the answer is not obvious. In the hypothetical's
situation, however, the current legal professional rules in all jurisdic-
tions instruct the lawyer to remain silent.'" In particular, the lawyer
7. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(a). The earlier Model Code provided in
DR 4-101(B)(1) that "a lawyer shall not knowingly ... [r]eveal a confidence or secret of
his client" except as was permitted by DR 4-101(C), part of which is quoted infra text
accompanying note 19 and none of which is pertinent to the hypothetical's facts. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR4-101(B)(1) (1969) (amended 1981)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The even earlier 'Canons of Professional Ethics stated
succinctly: "It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences." CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1908) (amended 1937) [hereinafter CANONS].
8. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389-90 (1981); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); MODEL
RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., paras. 2, 4; ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 89 (1992) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
9. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value
Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 349, 351-52 (1980).
10. Virtually all jurisdictions operate either under Model Rule 1.6 or Model Code DR
4-101. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3-:4 (Feb. 23,
1994) (indicating 42 states have adopted the Model Rules in some form). A number of
jurisdictions have varied the language of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), which allows permissive
disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.6(b)(1); see infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Some states have
promulgated rectification provisions which provide for disclosure of past crimes or frauds
involving the lawyer's services. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. However,
no jurisdiction has altered the language of Model Rule 1.6(a) and Model Code DR 4-
101(B)(1) in any significant way from the basic mandate to keep a client's confidences
concerning a completed crime of the type described in the hypothetical. See infra notes
28-46 and accompanying text.
The attorney-client privilege also attaches in such circumstances. See, eg., Alexander
v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 359-60 (1891) (finding error in the admission of testimony
by defendant's attorney because "the consultation was had after the crime was committed,
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is not permitted to reveal information about a past crime where the
representation involves a client's criminal defense11 -which is the
nature of the hypothetical's confidence. To disclose this information
and [the testimony] was offered in evidence as an admission tending to show that
defendant was concerned in the crime"); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d
28, 32 (Alaska 1974) ("[C]ommunications between advisor and client must pertain to
ongoing or future, rather than prior, wrongdoing before the [attorney-client] privilege
ceases to operate."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Rohrback, 591 A,2d 488,494
(Md. 1991) (stating that where client reveals to attorney commission of a completed
offense, attorney has "a duty not to reveal it; 'it would be hard to imagine a more serious
violation of the law of lawyering if he did"' (quoting 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.2:508 (2d ed. Supp. 1994))); State v. Phelps, 545 P.2d 901,
903 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) ("If a client consults an attorney about prior wrongdoing, there
is no doubt that the privilege protects their confidential communications.").
Also relevant to a lawyer's nondisclosure are those Model Rules which discuss
criminal or fraudulent acts by the attorney. Model Rule 8.4 states in part: "It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . ... (b) commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation ...."
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 8.4(b)-(c). Because the Model Rules' Terminology
section defines the term "fraud" as "conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely
negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information," id.
Terminology, para. 4, one bar association has concluded that an attorney's failure to
disclose client information does not violate Rule 8.4(c) where nondisclosure involved the
client's being incarcerated and getting worker's compensation and where incarceration
would disqualify the client for such payment. See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Prof. Guidance
Comm., Guidance Op. 94-21 (1994), available at 1994 WL 802657, at *2. After analyzing
Pennsylvania's versions of Model Rules 1.6 and 4.1, the bar association also found no
affirmative obligation on the part of the attorney to disclose the client's confidences, unless
the lawyer determined that nondisclosure was a crime by the attorney under the worker's
compensation statute and a violation of Rule 8.4(b). See id. at *3-*4.
11. Comments or guidelines to some jurisdictions' ethical rules make this clear, even
where those jurisdictions permit or require disclosure in some situations. See, e.g.,
CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 12, reprinted in
CONNECTICUT RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 337 (1995) ("Paragraph (c)
[permitting certain disclosures] does not apply where a lawyer is employed after a crime
or fraud has been committed to represent the client in matters ensuing therefrom.");
MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 17, reprinted in
MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT. STATE 573 (1995) ("Paragraph (c)(3) [permitting certain
disclosures] does not apply where a lawyer is employed after a crime or fraud has been
committed to represent the client in matters ensuing therefrom."); MINN. STAT. ANN., CT.
R., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 4 (West 1993)
("A lawyer is not permitted, however, to disclose a client's criminal or fraudulent act
committed prior to the client's retention of the lawyer's services."); see also 1 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 10, § 1.6:201-1, at 158.7 ("[T]he generalization [that a lawyer has an
unqualified duty of confidentiality to a client] is essentially accurate only when the
representation involves defense of a criminal accused.").
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would prevent clients from seeking legal advice to protect their
rights. 2
And yet, under the circumstances stated in the hypothetical, the
lawyer's mandate seems onerous to many in the profession and
incomprehensible to nonlawyers.- Perhaps surety on this issue has
become more troublesome because the legal profession has in recent
years seemed more willing to allow lawyers to reveal confidences in
certain other situations, such as concerning a future crime-especially
if it involves the possibility of death or serious bodily injury-or a
past or ongoing fraud. 3
But to know as lawyers that we' may not reveal the client's
confidences in the hypothetical situation, we must be clear what this
situation is not. This is not a confession of a client's intent to commit
a future crime. 4 It is also not a confidence concerning a past or
12. See In re Mendel, 897 P.2d 68, 74 (Alaska 1995) ("'[T]he privilege is designed to
encourage those who may have committed a prior wrong to seek protection of their rights,'
which is why this court distinguishes between past and ongoing or future wrongdoing."
(quoting Munn v. Bristol Bay Hous. Auth., 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989))); cf State v.
Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (denying request of lawyers who had represented
actual, now deceased murderer to testify at trial of one charged with murder because
testimony would breach attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978);
People v. Cassas, 646 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1995) (holding lawyer's statement to police that
client shot his own wife was inadmissible at trial absent client's consent as violative of the
attorney-client privilege); Estate of D'Alessio v. Gilberg, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484,486 (App. Div.
1994) (denying application of executor for hit-and-run victim to compel attorney to reveal
name of client who may have been hit-and-run driver because client's identity was
privileged communication).
13. See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (discussing the many variations of the
confidentiality rule in the 51 jurisdictions).
14. The fact pattern makes clear that this murder had occurred seven years earlier.
Symposium Problem The Wrong Man is About to Be Executed For a Crime He Did Not
Commit, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1543 (1996) [hereinafter Hypothetical]. The only aspect
of the situation that is in the future or ongoing is the client's unwillingness to confess in
order to save the other person from execution. Id. at 1544-45. While this unwillingness
to confess could be viewed as the indirect cause of the other's death-should it
occur-failure to confess is not a crime under our present laws. Absent the intent of the
client to commit a crime that will lead to another's death or substantial bodily harm, the
lawyer is given no permission to disclose under the ethical rules. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 3, Rule 1.6(b)(1). There is an analogy in this situation to the fact that our laws
also impose no duty on a stranger to aid another in danger, even when the danger is life-
threatening. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. While there are a
few states whose statutes seem to require an individual to give assistance to another who
is in harm's way, each of those provisions impose the duty only if it can be done without
endangering the one lending aid. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604A.01 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 519 (1973).
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ongoing crime or fraud of the type that some jurisdictions now permit
a lawyer to disclose. 5 While the profession's framing of a lawyer's
duty of confidentiality toward these two situations has varied over the
years, there has been no variance toward the situation of our
hypothetical.
For example, concerning a client's announcement of intent to
commit a crime, the ABA explicitly stated in its first codification of
legal professional ethics that "[t]he announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which [the
lawyer] is bound to respect."' 6 However, about thirty-five years later
the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility issued an opinion which held that where an attorney refuses to
represent a client because there was no basis for the client's claim,
that attorney cannot reveal the client's planned false statements to a
second attorney because any such disclosure would breach the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality to the client. 7 The Committee's
opinion did not address the issue that its conclusion seemed to
contradict the above-quoted language of Canon 372
When adopted in 1969, the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (Model Code) seemed to bridge the two positions by continuing
the general approach of the earlier Canon but making explicit that a
lawyer was permitted, but not mandated, to "reveal... [t]he intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime."' 9
Concerning a past or ongoing fraud, the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics instructed the lawyer to "inform the injured
person or his counsel" of such a situation, assuming the client refused
15. See infra note 40-44, 79 and accompanying text (concerning the so-called
rectification provisions). These rectification statutes, with one exception, permit disclosure
only when the services of the lawyer have been used by the client to accomplish the crime
or fraud. See infra note 47 (describing the one statute that permits disclosure otherwise
than under these circumstances).
16. CANONS, supra note 7, Canon 37.
17. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945).
18. See generally id. (holding, without acknowledging that Canon 37 did not include
within a lawyer's confidentiality duty a client's intention to commit a crime, that an
attorney whose former client has lied to another attorney in order to create a cause of
action not barred by the statute of limitations cannot disclose the truth to the second
attorney).
19. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C)(3).
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to rectify it.' Commentators have interpreted the meaning of this
Canon as mandatory as to the lawyer's disclosure duty.2' Neverthe-
less, in 1953 the ABA Standing Committee ruled that a lawyer may
not disclose a client's perjury if knowledge of it was discovered after
the proceeding in which the perjury occurred had concluded.22
Again, this opinion contradicted the language of this Canon.'
Despite this formal ABA opinion, the 1969 Model Code
continued the approach of Canon 41 that a fraud victim be informed
of the client's wrongdoing 4 Within a few years, however, the ABA
altered this longstanding disclosure rule by amending the Code
provision to prohibit revealing a client's fraud "when the information
is protected as a privileged communication."'  An ABA formal
20. See CANONS, supra note 7, Canon 41. Canon 41 provides in part:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which
has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it;
at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage
thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his
counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps.
Id.
21. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 282 (1990) ("Canon 41 imposed a mandatory duty to disclose both past and
ongoing fraud, whether or not the lawyer's services had been used to perpetrate the
fraud.").
22. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (1953); cf ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (holding in part that
a lawyer who learns that the lawyer's client has committed perjury prior to the conclusion
of the proceedings must disclose that information to the tribunal if the client refuses to
rectify the situation).
23. The ABA panel noted:
We do not believe that Canon 41 was directed at a case such as that here
presented [where in order to get a divorce one spouse testified falsely on the
date of desertion of the other] but rather at one in which, in a civil suit, the
lawyer's client has secured an improper advantage over the other through fraud
or deception.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
24. As originally drafted Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1) provided:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that... [h]is client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client
refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (Final Draft 1969). As noted
by one commentator, "The only significant departure from the language of Canon 41 [was]
in the statement that the information the lawyer receives must 'clearly establish' the client
fraud." Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility:
Too Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. TEx. L. REv. 727, 731 (1994).
25. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1). Some jurisdictions never
adopted the ABA's amendment. Indeed, in the few states still using the Model Code as
June 1996] 1665
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opinion then emphasized that this amendment was intended to reverse
this disclosure duty as to all client confidences, not just evidentiary
privileged communications.26
This amendment reflected a deepening division between the trial
bar and the counselling bar within the ABA." In the 1983 Model
Rules, the trial bar's position.prevailed, as it had with the amendment
to Model Code DR 7-101(B)(1). The Model Rules as drafted do not,
therefore, require disclosure of future or ongoing crimes to the person
injured by the client's act or planned act.' However, the Model
the basis for their ethical rules, some use the original version of Model Code DR 7-
102(B)(1), which requires the lawyer to reveal the fraud of a client perpetrated during the
course of the representation. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 app., R. & REGS. FOR ORG.
& GOV'T OF THE STATE BAR OF GA. pt. III, ch. 1, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rr DR 7-102(B)(1) (Harrison 1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. XIX, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1) (Anderson 1994). Others seem to have modified
the mandatory requirement of the original Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1) by adding a
provision to their version of Model Code DR 4-101 permitting the lawyer to reveal a
client's confidences in order to rectify the effects of a client's criminal or fraudulent act
which was done using the lawyer's services. See, e.g., MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(3), reprinted in MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT: STATE 572 (1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN., CT. R., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(4) (West 1993).
26. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975)
("The balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best
made by interpreting the phrase 'privileged communication' in the 1974 amendment to DR
7-102(B) as referring to those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved
by DR 4-101."). Commentators have observed that "[o]n this interpretation, the amend-
ment operatively repeals the duty to disclose fraud, while nominally preserving it, which
is surely disingenuous." HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 21, at 284.
27. See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 731-32.
28. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (permitting, but not mandating,
disclosure of client's intent to commit a crime likely to result in death or substantial
injury); cf id Rule 4.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to disclose a
material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client's
criminal or fraudulent act, unless disclosure is prohibited by Model Rule 1.6).
The Model Rules also mandate certain disclosures to a tribunal in specific
circumstances. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(4), (b). In contrast to Model Rule 1.6, the lawyer is
under higher disclosure standards when before a tribunal and is not permitted to
knowingly offer false evidence. See id, Rule 3.3(a)(4); supra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing Model Rule 1.6). If such testimony is offered and the lawyer then learns of its
falsity before the conclusion of the proceedings, the lawyer is to take remedial measures
which could include disclosure to the tribunal. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 3.3
cmt., para. 11. These duties apply "even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by rule 1.6." See id Rule 3.3(b). However, the hypothetical's facts
do not suggest there has been any false evidence presented to a tribunal by the attorney
or client. Therefore, these higher standards do not apply here.
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Rules do give a lawyer permission to reveal a client's intent to commit
a crime that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily injury.2 9
Only ten states have actually adopted the Model Rules' approach
and limited disclosure to the situation where the lawyer believes the
client will kill or seriously injure another, making even that disclosure
permissive The other forty-one jurisdictions" , in adopting legal
ethics rules, came up with numerous variations to Model Rule 1.6(b)
regarding the scope of a lawyer's duty of confidentiality.
In considering the Model Rules' proposal to allow disclosure only
for the most serious crimes, twenty-four states decided to stick with
the broader view of the Model Code, permitting their lawyers to
reveal client confidences to prevent a crime whenever the lawyer
29. When the Kutak Commission presented its final draft of Model Rule 1.6 to the
ABA House of Delegates, it included not only the permissive disclosure discussed in the
text above, but also permission for the lawyer to reveal information necessary both to
prevent the client "from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result.., in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another," and "to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used." AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROF. STANDARDS, FINAL DRAFr-MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), (2), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR AsS'N
JOURNAL, at 9 (Supp. Nov. 1982). After debate at several meetings of the ABA House
of Delegates, the Model Rules were adopted in August 1983, but with those sections of the
proposed Model Rule 1.6 quoted above deleted. See 108 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N 1219-21, 1239 (1983).
In 1991 the ABA Committee on Ethics again proposed the provision to permit
lawyers to disclose client confidences to rectify a client's misdeeds when the lawyer's
services were used. By a vote of 158-251, the House defeated the proposal. See
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
11 (1991).
30. See ALA. CODE, ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(Michie 1990); DEL. R. ANN., DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995); D.C. Cr. R. ANN., D.C. BAR R. app. A, RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (Michie 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN., Ky. R.
ANN., R. SUP. Cr. 3.130, KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, ch. 4 app., art. XVI, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (West 1988); Mo. SUP. Cr. R., RULES GOVERNING THE
MISSOURI BAR AND THE JUDICIARY 4, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1), reprinted in MISSOURI RULES OF COURT' STATE AND FEDERAL 20 (1996);
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1); N.H. Cr.
R. ANN., NEW HAMPSHIRE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(Buttevrworth 1995); R.I. Cr. R. ANN., SUP. Cr. R. art. V, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. tit. 16, ch. 16-18 app.,
SOUTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995).
31. The total number of jurisdictions is 51 because the District of Columbia is also
included.
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believes the client has an intent to commit the crime.3" Five jurisdic-
tions took a middle approach and permitted their lawyers to reveal
client confidences to prevent not only the client's intent to seriously
harm or kill, but also to substantially injure the financial interest or
property of another.3 However, nine states have made the require-
32. See ARK. CODE ANN., CT. R., PROCEDURES OF THE COURT REGULATING
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT., CT. R. ch. 18-20 app.,
COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Supp. 1995); GA. CODE
ANN. tit. 9 app., R. & REGS. FOR ORG. & GOV'T OF STATE BAR OF GA. pt. III, ch. 1,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Harrison 1989); IDAHO RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1993), published by Legal Information
Institute, Cornell Law School, at http'J/www.law.comell.edu:80/lawyers/ruletable.htm; IND.
CODE ANN., IND. R.P., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Bums 1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. tit. XV, ch. 602 app., IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR LAWYERS DR 4-101(C)(3) (West 1996); R. SUP. Cr. KAN. 226, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in KANSAS COURT RULES AND
PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 459 (1996); ME. BAR R. 3, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.6(h)(4), reprinted in MAINE RULES OF COURT: STATE AND
FEDERAL 349 (1995); MASS. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 3:07, CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLIN-
ARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW DR 4-101(C)(3), reprinted in
MASSACHUSETrS RULES OF COURT: STATE 278 (1995); MICHIGAN RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(4), reprinted in MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT:
STATE 572 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN., Cr. R., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (West 1993); MISSISSIPPI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in MISSISSIPPI RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 313
(1995); NEB. R. CT. ANN., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3)
(Michie 1995); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, pt. 1200, DISCIPLINARY RULES OF
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1200.19(c)(3) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. R., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
Rule 4(c)(4) (Michie 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. XIX, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch, 1, app,
3-A, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (West 1996); OREGON CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101, reprinted in OREGON RULES OF COURT 398
(1995); S.C. CODE ANN., S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN., CT. R. ANN., R. SUP. Cr. 8, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie 1995); VT. STAT. ANN., SUP. Cr.
ADMIN. ORDERS & R., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1986);
WASH. Cr. R. ANN. pt. 1, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Law. Co-
op. 1995); W. VA. CODE ANN., CT. R., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996); WYo. CT. R. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
ATTORNEYS AT LAW Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995).
33. See ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in
ALASKA COURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 444 (1995); R. SUP. Cr. HAW. exh. A,
HAWAII RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1), reprinted in HAWAII COURT
RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 229 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., MD. R. app., MARYLAND
LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (Michie 1996); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995);
UTAH CODE ANN., UTAH Cr. R., UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. ch. 13, RULES OF
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ment mandatory to reveal a client's plan to kill or seriously harm, 4
and the majority of those then made permissive any disclosure about
any other future intent, whether the intent .to substantially injure
financial or property interests"s or other general criminal intent
3 6
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995). This variation, of course,
mirrored Model Rule 1.6, as it was first proposed to the ABA House of Delegates in 1982.
See supra note 29.
34. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. R. 42, ARIZONA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT ER 1.6(b) (West 1988); CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b), reprinted in CONNECTICUT RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 336
(1995); ILL. ANN. STAT., SUP. CT. R., ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN., Cr. R. ANN., NEV. SUP.
CT. R. 156(2) (Michie 1996); NJ. R. GEN. APPLICATION pt. I app., RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT. STATE
AND FEDERAL 124 (1995); N.D. Cr. R. ANN., NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (Michie 1996) (requiring disclosure when death or substantial bodily
harm is "imminent"); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G app., art. X, § 9, TEXAS
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.05(e) (West Supp. 1996); WIS.
SUP. CT. R. ch. 20, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS Rule 20:1.6(b),
reprinted in WISCONSIN COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE: STATE 1110 (1995); see also
N.M. R. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-606(B) (Michie 1995)
(providing that, the lawyer "should" reveal such information).
35. This is true for four of the jurisdictions cited supra note 34. See CONNECTICUT
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1), reprinted in CONNECTICUT RULES OF
COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 336 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT., SUP. CT. R., ILLINOIS RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. R.
ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-606(C) (Michie 1995); N.D. CT. R.
ANN., NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(d) (Michie 1996)
(permitting disclosure if necessary to prevent injury to financial interest, property injury,
nonimminent substantial bodily harm or death).
Two states, Wisconsin and New Jersey, also made mandatory the disclosure of
information necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
that would be likely to result in substantial injury to financial interest or property. See
N.J. R. GEN. APPLICATION pt. I app., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b),
reprinted in NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT. STATE AND FEDERAL 124 (1995); WIS. SUP.
CT. R. ch. 20, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS Rule 20:1.6(b),
reprinted in WISCONSIN COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE: STATE 1110 (1995). Nevada
imposes no duty other than that discussed in text accompanying note 34 supra. See
generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN., Cr. R. ANN., NEV. SUP. CT. R. 156 (Michie 1996)
(providing that a lawyer shall reveal information related to representation to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm).
36. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., SUP. Cr. R. 42, ARIZONA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT ER 1.6(c) (West 1988) (providing that the lawyer may reveal the client's
intention to commit a crime and information necessary to prevent it); TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G app., art. X, § 9, TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c)(7) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that the lawyer may reveal
confidences reasonably believed necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
or fraudulent act).
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One state made both types of client intent mandatory,37 and another
made mandatory the disclosure of a client's stated intent to commit
any crime and information necessary to prevent it once the client was
notified of the attorney's duty, unless the client abandoned the
plan. 8 In stark contrast to all these variations on lawyer disclosure
duties, one state's lawyer confidentiality provision allows no disclosure
of any kind.39
In addition to all these differences in the standards for disclosure
as to future crimes, fifteen states have adopted rectification provisions.
Thirteen of these states permit a lawyer to reveal information
necessary to rectify the results of a client's criminal or fraudulent act
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcr Rule 4-1.6(b)(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996) (discussing disclosure to prevent
client's committing a crime); id. Rule 4-1.6(b)(2) (discussing disclosure to prevent a death
or substantial bodily harm to another).
38. See VA. CODE ANN., R. SUP. CT. VA. § II, VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(1) (Michie 1995).
39. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1993) ("It is the duty of an
attorney... [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself
to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."). California has no specific ethical rule
concerning client confidences. See generally CAL. CODE CT. R., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1-100 to 5-320 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995) (outlining the ethical obligations
of California attorneys). Thus, one local California bar association has opined that
California lawyers have no discretion to disclose a client's intent to murder a codefendant
who has decided to cooperate with the prosecutor and incriminate the client. See San
Diego County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1990-1 (1990),
reprinted in 1 STATE BAR OF CAL., CALIFORNIA COMPENDIUM ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY pt. IIC, at 382-85 (1993) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA COMPENDIUM]. By
contrast, another local bar association has taken the view in dictum that the Model Rule
approach is appropriate and "disclosure of future crimes is only permitted in situations
where such crimes are likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily injury." Los
Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Op. 436 (1985), reprinted in 2 CALIFORNIA COMPENDIUM,
supra, at 138, 140.
Even if California's ethical duty seems absolute by its terms, its attorney-client
privilege is limited by the crime-fraud exception which provides that communications
between an attorney and client are not privileged "if the services of the lawyer were
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a
fraud." CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1995); see, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
App. 4th 1757, 1768,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 740 (1995). The California legislature has also
enacted another exception which states: "There is no privilege ... if the lawyer
reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to
representation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm." CAL. EVID.
CODE § 956.5 (West 1995). For an analysis of the operation of this exception, see Fred
C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367
(1995).
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in which the lawyer's services were used.' One state requires its
lawyers to reveal to the victim or a tribunal a client's fraud which has
involved the lawyer's services,4' while another's rule has both a
mandatory and permissive provision. The mandatory part only
requires a lawyer to reveal information that "clearly establishes" the
client's criminal or fraudulent act in order to rectify the situation
when it has resulted in substantial injury to another's financial
interests or property.42 The permissive provision allows, but does
not require, a lawyer to reveal information in order to rectify what
the lawyer "reasonably believes" is a client fraud or crime.4 One
additional state allows a lawyer to reveal such client information as is
40. CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2), reprinted in
CONNECTICUT RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 336 (1995); MD. CODE ANN.,
MD. R. app., MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2)
(Michie 1996); MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(3), reprinted
in MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT: STATE 572 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN., CT. R. ANN.,
NEV. SUP. Cr. R. 156(3)(a) (Michie 1996) (permitting disclosure both to prevent or rectify
but first requiring lawyer's efforts to persuade client to take corrective action); N.J. R.
GEN. APPLICATION pt. I app., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1),
reprinted in NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 124 (1995); N.D. CT.
R. ANN., NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6(f), 3.3(c)
(Michie 1996) (permitting disclosure both to prevent or rectify unless disclosure is to a
court and the falsity discovered by the lawyer was contained in the client's testimony);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(2) (West 1996) (but first requiring lawyer's efforts to get client to rectify); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995)
(permitting disclosure both to prevent or rectify); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. tit. 16, ch.
16-18 app., SOUTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Michie
1995); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G app., art. X, § 9, TEXAS DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c)(8) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN., UTAH CT. R., UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. ch. 13, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN., R. SUP. Cr. VA. § II, VIRGINIA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie 1995) (permitting
lawyer to reveal information which clearly establishes client has during representation
perpetrated fraud on another related to the subject matter of representation, apparently
even if the lawyer's services have not been used); WIS. SUP. Cr. R. ch. 20, RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATrORNEYS Rule 20:1.6(c)(1), reprinted in WISCONSIN
COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE: STATE 1110 (1995). The rectification provision adopted
by all states but Virginia mirrored Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) as it was first proposed to the
ABA House of Delegates in 1982 and reproposed in 1991. See supra note 29.
41. See GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 app., R. & REGS. FOR ORG. & GOV'T OF STATE BAR
OF GA. pt. III, ch. 1, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (Harrison
1989) (maintaining the Model Code rectification provision with no exception for privileged
information).
42. See R. Sup. CT. HAW. exh. A, HAWAII RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b), reprinted in HAWAII COURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 229 (1995).
43. See id. Rule 1.6(c)(2).
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"implicit" in the lawyer's withdrawal of a previously given statement
on which a nonclient still relies where the lawyer has learned that the
statement was based on material inaccurate information or where it
is being used in a continuing fraud or crime.'
As earlier noted, none of these amendments by the various state
jurisdictions to the ABA's formulation of Model Rule 1.6(b) affect
the basic mandate of a lawyer's ethical obligation to maintain a
client's confidences in the hypothetical's situation under Model Rule
1.6(a) as presently interpreted.45 Thus, under the profession's ethical
standards in all jurisdictions, the lawyer in the hypothetical must
maintain her silence about her client's past crime absent his consent
to disclosure.46 This client's crime is not even subject to the rectifi-
cation provisions that some jurisdictions have adopted because there
is no inference in the facts that the lawyer's services were used by the
client in performing his criminal act- nor would a crime of murder
be likely to involve the services of one's attorney. The attorney's only
option pursuant to the letter of the profession's ethical rules is to
withdraw from representing the client.48 However, withdrawal will
44. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, pt. 1200, DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1200.19(c)(5) (1995).
45. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(a); see supra text accompanying note 7
(quoting the text of Model Rule 1.6); supra note 11 (quoting parts of comments making
that clear). The same would be true in jurisdictions still using the Model Code. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(B)(1) (stating that "a lawyer shall not knowingly
... [r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client" except as was permitted by DR 4-101(C));
cf Sloan v. State Bar of Nev., 726 P.2d 330, 333 (Nev. 1986) ("[W]e know of no statute
... which would make it an offense to fail to disclose to the authorities that a crime has
taken place.").
46. Arguably the client has given consent to the lawyer's talking to the prosecutors
about a deal involving his confession, but he was adamant that any such discussion not
reveal his identity. Hypothetical, supra note 14, at 1545.
47. In the one jurisdiction, Virginia, which seems to permit disclosure to rectify even
situations not involving the lawyer's services, the type of client activity allowed to be
disclosed is fraud-and murder is not fraud. See VA. CODE ANN., R. Sup. Cr. VA. § II,
VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie 1995)
(permitting lawyer to reveal information which clearly establishes client has during
representation defrauded another related to the subject matter of representation, and
making no absolute requirement that lawyer's services have been used in the fraud).
48. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16. A basis for withdrawal may be found
in Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) which allows permissive withdrawal where "a client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant." Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3). Rule
1.16(a)(1) might also be a basis if the lawyer's competence and ability to represent the
client would be affected by negative feelings concerning the client's past act. See id. Rule
1.16(a)(1) (requiring lawyer's withdrawal from representation of a client if representation
will result in violation of ethical rules). However, since the hypothetical seems to suggest
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not give the lawyer leave to reveal the client's confidences as the duty
continues after the representation ends.49 This is also not the kind
of situation where notice of the lawyer's withdrawal might alert an
affected third party,5" since the person convicted of the client's crime
is not an opposing party or one with whom the lawyer might have had
contact in connection with representation of the client.
This review of the present state of lawyer-client confidentiality in
the various jurisdictions in general and as it pertains to the hypotheti-
cal begins to illustrate what a tangled web the profession has woven.
The hypothetical as a teaching tool could help introduce these issues
to law students so that they do not enter the profession unprepared,
for most law students come to law school thinking as nonlawyers-as
laypersons. Many of them would therefore approach this hypothetical
from a high moral ground, believing that the lawyer must reveal the
client's wrong in order to save the other person. They have not had
an opportunity to consider why a bright-line rule of confidentiality is
important in order to give all clients assurance that their attorneys will
keep their confidences about their past acts, no matter what. They
have not yet thought about how allowing an attorney in the hypothet-
ical's situation to reveal the client's confidences puts the profession
that the lawyer is appointed counsel, a public defender, she will need permission of the
court to withdraw, whatever the basis. See id. Rule 1.16(c) & cmt., para. 3.
49. See Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 945,
155 Cal. Rptr. 393, 400 (1979) (confidentiality duty is owed to both present and former
clients); In re Robak, 654 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1995) (confidentiality duty is owed both
present and former clients); Solow v. W.R. Grace & Co., 632 N.E2d 437, 439-40 (N.Y.
1994) (confidentiality duty is owed both present and former clients); MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.9(c) (stating that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a former client or use such information to that client's disadvantage
except as permitted by Model Rules 1.6 and 3.3); ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note
8, at 91.
50. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 15 (noting that the ethical
rules do not "preventf the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the
lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like");
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992)
(concluding, in part, that withdrawal is required if the fact of representation of the client
"is likely to be known to and relied upon by third persons to whom [the client's]
continuing fraud is directed," and permitting the lawyer to disavow any work product to
prevent its use in client's continuing or planned future fraud, even if that results in the
disclosure of client confidences); supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, pt. 1200, DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1200.19(c)(5) (1995), which allows revealing of client
information upon withdrawal).
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even farther down the slippery slope of feeling freer to make
confidential disclosures.
In addition to providing an occasion to discuss the role and duty
of an individual attorney in this situation, the hypothetical would
permit a professor to explore with the law students their option to
urge the client on moral grounds to confess or to authorize disclosure
in order to save the person convicted of the murder committed by the
client. Certainly nothing in the profession's ethical rules would
prevent such a discussion between attorney and client.5 In response
to such urging, possibly the client will consent to disclosure or take
action himself This client already feels the other person does not
deserve to die, and he is concerned enough about the situation that
he has also confided in his clergy and his psychiatrist.52 However, it
is also possible that the client will refuse to agree to any disclosure,
especially since such disclosure may put his own life at risk. If the
client refuses, this lawyer will be required to maintain silence even if
her own values would dictate a different action. However, as earlier
noted, she can consider withdrawal.
Because this situation arguably involves a life-and-death situation
for both the client and the other person, the hypothetical is a useful
example of how there are no fully satisfactory answers to ethical
dilemmas. The class discussion could look at the situation from
several different perspectives: the client's, the convicted defendant's,
the prosecutor's, even the victim's family's. Given these different
perspectives, and also given that because the other person might be
seen by some as not totally sympathetic,5 3 students are likely to have
different views on whether they would be morally outraged enough
by the client's requirement of silence to consider civil disobedience.54
51. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 13 ("Where practical, the
lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action."); cf. id. Rule 3.3 cmt.,
para. 11 ("If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper
course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially.").
52. Hypothetical, supra note 14, at 1545-46.
53. The client describes him as "a nasty dude." Id at 1544.
54. In this regard the level of outrage might differ from that presented in Spaulding
v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). In Spaulding a lawyer who was defending
a client who was civilly sued after an automobile accident did not disclose to the plaintiff
that he had a life-threatening aorta aneurysm discovered in an examination by the
defendant's medical expert. See id at 707-08. Thus, Spaulding presented a situation where
the life of the other party was involved, but only the financial interest of the client was at
stake, in terms of an increased settlement or judgment if the aneurysm was found to be
caused by the accident. Nevertheless, the court in Spaulding ruled the lawyer was not
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Thus, the class discussion would also cover the students' need to be
prepared to accept whatever the consequences may be of acting on
one's higher moral position. If the lawyer reveals the client's
confidences, the client could certainly be expected to file a complaint,
and since the disclosure would put the client at high risk, the lawyer
could also anticipate the Bar authorities bringing disciplinary charges
against her. The bottom line question the students might need to ask
themselves is-"Am I willing to give up my Bar 'ticket'?"
As earlier noted, the hypothetical also gives the opportunity to
consider the overarching issue of where the profession is headed given
the current array of disclosure standards nationwide. This very array
suggests the profession is on a slope that is likely to get more and
more slippery. Clearly the profession does not have one mind
concerning the extent to which a client's confidences should or will be
protected. Moreover, there is no longer clear unanimity even on
keeping a client's past crimes anonymous. Where a lawyer's services
have been used, the rectification provisions permit-and in one state
require-lawyers to reveal information about their clients, including
client confidences, sufficient to rectify the consequences of a client's
past criminal or fraudulent act.55 Yet as one court has recognized,
"[flew questions are graver or more serious in the practice of law than
determining what evidence of crime or fraud justifies a lawyer's
disclosure of his client's confidential information.,
56
Where an attorney is given the discretion to disclose the client's
confidences, whether it be to prevent some future crime or to rectify
a past crime, the attorney must reach a decision whether disclosure is
appropriate under the circumstances. This is not an easy task since
it creates a conflict for the attorney with the traditional duty of the
profession to maintain client confidences. One might expect that a
provision suggesting the attorney may make such disclosures would
use language that would give some guidance on when disclosure is
under a duty to disclose this critical information to the plaintiff. See id. at 709.
55. See supra notes 40-44.
56. X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Va. 1992) (granting employer-
client's motion for injunction to prevent employee-attorney's disclosure of confidential
information), aff'd sub nor. Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994).
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proper 7 However, this is only true to a limited degree; the provi-
sions currently in existence leave a great deal to lawyers' discretion.
For example, those jurisdictions which follow the Model Rules'
limited disclosure approach provide that "[a] lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary...
to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm.""8 The italicized words are presumedly intended to create a
somewhat heightened standard governing the lawyer's decision to
disclose, even in the situation where another's life may be at risk.
Thus, unless the lawyer believes the client is going to take action with
the stated results, there is no discretion to make any disclosure at all.
And while some may feel imminent death is pretty clear, others might
differ on what substantial bodily injury is. The comments for this
Model Rule add little more. They do acknowledge that disclosure
may occur absent actual knowledge that the client will act,59 and they
suggest that "[t]he lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consider-
ation of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with
the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the
lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may
extenuate the conduct in question."' 6 While this discussion does not
therefore provide very specific guidance for a lawyer's disclosure
decision in this serious situation, it does at least alert the lawyer to
consider even this decision thoughtfully.
As earlier discussed, a few states permit their lawyers to reveal
client confidences not only for this most serious form of future crime,
but also to prevent the client's commission of a crime or fraud "that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in ... substantial injury to the
57. How much to disclose is typically defined in terms similar to that in the Model
Rules: "such information [as] the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the
client from committing the criminal act." MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(b)(1); see
also id. Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 13 ("In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest
should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose.").
58. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (emphasis added); see supra note 30
and accompanying text.
59. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 12 ("The lawyer may make
a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which the lawyer
reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a lawyer to 'know' when
such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of
mind.").
60. Id. Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 13.
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financial interest or property of another."'" Again, the italicized
words seem intended to qualify the scope of the discretion accorded.
However, four of the five jurisdictions provide no clarification of
those terms in their ethical rule.6 Even the one state that has some
discussion of the additional bases for a lawyer's discretionary
disclosure gives no real definition.6 Thus, the lawyer is given no
further guidance concerning the serious harm situations and no
guidance at all for judging when injury to another's financial interest
or property is "substantial."
61. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in ALASKA
COURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 444 (1995) (emphasis added); MD. CODE ANN.,
MD. R. app., MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(c)(1)
(Michie 1996) (emphasis added); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added); UTAH CODE ANN., UTAH
CT. R., UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. ch. 13, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995) (emphasis added). Hawaii calls for the lawyer to "reasonably
believe." R. SUP. CT. HAW. exh. A, HAWAII RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(c)(1), reprinted in HAWAII COURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 229 (1995).
62. See ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in
ALASKA COURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 445 (1995); R. SUP. CT. HAW. exh. A,
HAWAII RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1), reprinted in HAWAII COURT
RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL 230 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., MD. R. app., MARYLAND
LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.6(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
'Alaska simply adopts the Model Rules' comments with no change at all. Hawaii,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania modify the Model Rules' comments discussed and quoted in
text and supra note 59, by adding without further definition the phrase "substantial injury
to the financial interests or property of another" to the comment discussion's mention of
"homicide or serious bodily injury." R. SUP. CT. HAW. exh. A, HAWAII RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1), reprinted in HAWAII COURT RULES: STATE AND
FEDERAL 230 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., MD. R. app., MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995); see supra note 59 (quoting
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 12).
63. See UTAH CODE ANN., UTAH Cr. R., UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. ch. 13, RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995). The comment to the Utah
provision provides in pertinent part:
[T]he lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal
or fraudulent. .. . If the prospective crime or fraud is likely to result in
substantial injury, the lawyer may feel a moral obligation to take preventive
action. When the threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or serious bodily
injury, the lawyer may have an obligation under tort or criminal law to take
reasonable preventive measures. Whether the lawyer's concern is based on
moral or legal considerations, the interest in preventing the harm may be more
•compelling than the interest in preserving confidentiality of information relating
to the client.
Id. Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 9.
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In addition to those jurisdictions that have specifically limited
disclosure to set situations, almost half the jurisdictions permit
disclosure whenever the client has an intention to commit any crime.
These provisions usually take one of two approaches. The first
follows the language of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) but eliminates that part
of the provision which limits the "criminal act" to one the attorney
"believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm."'" Where these jurisdictions adopted the Model Rules'
comments to their rule,65 most simply dropped the description of the
crime but otherwise kept virtually unchanged the text of the com-
ment.66 Thus, in those jurisdictions the comments still suggest that
an attorney be thoughtful in making the disclosure decision, but no
guidance is given as to what crimes are proper subjects for disclosure.
Three jurisdictions did a little more. One jurisdiction does note
that its version of the rule.is different from Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), and
that the language concerning "imminent death or substantial bodily
64. See ARK. CODE ANN., CT. R., PROCEDURES OF THE COURT REGULATING
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995); IDAHO RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, Rule
1.6(b)(1) (1993) (published by Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, at
http'//www.law.cornell.edu:80/lawyerslruletable.html); IND. CODE ANN., IND. R.P., RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Bums 1995); R. SUP. Cr. KAN. 226, MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in KANSAS COURT RULES
AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 459 (1996); MISSISSIPPI RULES OF PROFESSION-
AL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in MISSISSIPPI RULES OF COURT: STATE AND
FEDERAL 313 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN., S.C. APP. Cr. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1995); WASH. Cr. R. ANN. pt. 1, RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1995); W. VA. CODE ANN., Cr. R.,
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996); WYO. Cr. R. ANN.,
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATrORNEYS AT LAW Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie
1995).
65. See ARK. CODE ANN., Cr. R., PROCEDURES OF THE COURT REGULATING
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATrORNEYS AT LAW, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995); R. SUP. Cr. KAN. 226, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in KANSAS COURT RULES AND
PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 459 (1996); MISSISSIPPI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in MISSISSIPPI RULES OF COURT: STATE AND
FEDERAL 313 (1995); WASH. Cr. R. ANN. pt. 1, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule
1.6(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1995); WYO. Cr. R. ANN., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1995). Surprisingly, one state did not
drop the comment language referring to "homicide or serious bodily injury," see supra
note 59 (quoting MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 12), thus leaving the
attorney unclear as to whether the nature of the criminal act is narrow or broad. See IND.
CODE ANN., IND. R.P., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Bums 1995).
66. See supra note 59 and text accompanying note 60 (quoting the relevant portions
of the comment to Model Rule 1.6).
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harm" was deleted "to provide greater flexibility for the lawyer,
similar to the flexibility present under DR 4-101 of the [Model]
Code."'67 Another gives examples-that disclosure is permissible "to
prevent homicide or serious bodily injury or damage to another's
property or rights."'  The final jurisdiction suggests the attorney
may reveal information necessary to prevent a crime "based on a
determination of whether preventing the harm involved is more
compelling than preserving the confidentiality of information relating
to the client in a particular case."69 In sum, this group of jurisdic-
tions with provisions giving lawyers broad discretion to reveal client
confidences for generic future crimes provides very little useful
guidance for when an attorney's disclosure will be appropriate.
The second approach of this type of provision more closely tracks
the language of Model Code DR 4-101(C)(3) that an attorney may
reveal "the intention of [the] client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime."7  The way these
jurisdictions have handled defining the scope of this provision form is
67. See S.C. CODE ANN., S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
68. See W. VA. CODE ANN., CT. R., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996).
69. See MISSiSSiPPI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), reprinted in
MISsIsSIPPI RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 313 (1995).
70. See COLO. REV. STAT., CT. R. ch. 18-20 app., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSION-
AL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 app., R. & REGS. FOR ORG.
& GOV'T OF STATE BAR OF GA. pt. 11I, ch. 1, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(C)(3) (Harrison 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. tit. XV, ch. 602 app., IOWA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 4-101(C)(3) (West 1996); ME. BAR
R. 3, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.6(h)(4), reprinted in MAINE RULES
OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 349 (1995); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07, CANONS OF
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACrICE OF LAW DR 4-101(C)(3),
reprinted in MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF COURT: STATE 278 (1995); MICHIGAN RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(4), reprinted in MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT.
STATE 572 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN., Cr. R., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (West 1993); NEB. R. Cr. ANN., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie 1995); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
pt. 1200, DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
§ 1200.19(c)(3) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. R., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR Rule 4(c)(4) (Michie 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
tit. XIX, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Anderson 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (West 1996); OREGON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101,
reprinted in OREGON RULES OF COURT 398 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN., Cr. R. ANN.,
R.SuP. Cr. 8, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie 1995);
VT. STAT. ANN., SUP. Cr. ADMIN. ORDERS & R., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1986).
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even less illuminating. Eight jurisdictions have no descriptive
comments of any kind." Despite their provisions' similarity to the
Model Code, two jurisdictions have adopted the comments to Model
Rule 1.6 but without the death or serious harm limitation.72 Two
others have done the same but have added certain statements. One
provides that "[w]here the conduct is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial harm to the person or financial interests of
another, doubts should be resolved in favor of disclosure." 3 The
other states:
If the prospective crime is likely to result in substantial
injury, the lawyer may feel a moral obligation to take
preventive action. When the threatened injury is grave, such
as homicide or serious bodily injury, a lawyer may have an
obligation under tort or criminal law to take reasonable
preventive measures. Whether the lawyer's concern is based
on moral or legal considerations, the interest in preventing
the harm may be more compelling than the interest in
preserving confidentiality of information relating to the
client.74
Two other jurisdictions have continued using the Model Code's
Ethical Considerations (ECs) for further definition of their rules;
71. See GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 app., R. & REGS. FOR ORG. & GOV'T OF STATE BAR
OF GA. pt. III, ch. 1, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Harrison
1989); ME. BAR R. 3, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.6(h)(4), reprinted
in MAINE RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 349 (1995); MASS. SUP. JUD, Cr. R.
3:07, CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF
LAW DR 4-101(C)(3), reprinted in MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF COURT: STATE 278 (1995);
NEB. R. Cr. ANN., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie
1995); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, pt. 1200, DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1200.19(c)(3) (1995); OREGON CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101, reprinted in OREGON RULES OF COURT 398
(1995); TENN. CODE ANN., Cr. R. ANN., R. SUP. Cr. 8, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Michie 1995); VT. STAT. ANN., SUP. Cr. ADMIN.
ORDERS & R., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1986).
72. See COLO. REV. STAT., Cr. R. ch. 18-20 app., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSION-
AL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. R., RULES OF PROFESSION-
AL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR Rule 4(c)(4) (Michie 1995); supra
note 59 and accompanying text.
73. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 cmt. (West 1996).
74. See MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt., reprinted in
MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT- STATE 573 (1995).
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however, none of the ECs speak to the permissive disclosure
provision.75 The final jurisdiction has used a combination of the ECs
and the comment to Model Rule 1.6 but with no specific guidance on
this issue.76
This discussion emphasizes the difficulty of the decision-making
task of lawyers in just those states allowing some form of permissive
disclosure. And, as earlier noted, a number of jurisdictions have
further exacerbated that task by either mandating disclosure concern-
ing the most severe future crime of murder or maiming,77 or requir-
ing disclosure of even the less serious future crimes.7 All in all,
lawyers in jurisdictions where there is permission to disclose client
information concerning any future crime have been given very broad
discretion with virtually no definition of the provisions' terms and
scope.79 And those in jurisdictions mandating disclosure face even
75. See IOWA CODE ANN. tit. XV, ch. 602 app., IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 4-101(C)(3) (West 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit.
XIX, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (Anderson 1994).
76. See MINN. STAT. ANN., CT. R., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(3) (West 1993).
77. See supra notes 34, 37.
78. See supra notes 37-38.
79. This discussion has not even explored the variety of the rectification statutes which
permit the lawyer to reveal information about certain past crimes and frauds. See supra
notes 40-44. Suffice it to say, the level of guidance and definition in these rules is even
less than those in the permissive-mandatory future crime disclosure provisions. A number
of the provisions' comments merely provide a justification for the provision on the basis
that the lawyer's services were used and therefore the lawyer has an interest in being able
to rectify. See CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2),
reprinted in CONNECTICUT RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 336 (1995); MD.
CODE ANN., MD. R. app., MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Michie 1996); MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(c)(3), reprinted in MICHIGAN RULES OF COUR. STATE 572 (1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (West
1996) (but first requiring lawyer's efforts to get client to rectify); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.,
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting
disclosure both to prevent or rectify); UTAH CODE ANN., UTAH CT. R., UTAH CODE OF
JUD. ADMIN. ch. 13, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Michie 1995).
Only one statute warns that "the constitutional rights of defendants in criminal cases may
limit the extent to which counsel for a defendant may correct a misrepresentation that is
based on information provided by the client." See MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(3), reprinted in MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT: STATE 572 (1995).
Overall, the provisions suffer not only from the same failure to define "crime" or
"criminal act," see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text, but sometimes from no
definition of "fraud." The significance of the latter gap is emphasized in Prosser & Keeton
where it is noted that the word "fraud" has been used so indiscriminately and is "so vague
that it requires definition in nearly every case." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 14,
§ 105, at 727. However, those jurisdictions that have adopted all of the Model Rules'
1682 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1659
more serious difficulties in determining when they must breach client
confidences." Since a client has a right to enforce the attorney's
confidentiality duty, a client may challenge an attorney's disclosure,
especially one concerning a more minor crime or an insubstantial
injury." Another level of risk, especially in jurisdictions that require
certain disclosures, is a challenge by the Bar for failure to disclose.'
Only time will tell which voluntary disclosures or failures to disclose
will be found ethically appropriate by the courts and Bar disciplinary
authorities.'
comments do have a brief, vague definition of "fraud." See MODEL RULES, supra note
3, Terminology, para. 4 (defining fraud as "conduct having a purpose to deceive and not
merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information").
80. To highlight the difficulties facing lawyers in those jurisdictions, two states that
have elected to make disclosure merely permissive have emphasized in their guidance
comments the phrase quoted supra note 59 concerning knowledge, noting further that "[t]o
require disclosure when the client intends such an act, at the risk of professional discipline
if the assessment of the client's purpose turns out to be wrong, would be to impose a penal
risk that might interfere with the lawyer's resolution of an inherently difficult moral
dilemma." See MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 14,
reprinted in MICHIGAN RULES OF COURT. STATE 573 (1995); accord UTAH CODE ANN.,
UTAH CT. R., UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. ch. 13, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 10 (Michie 1995).
Virginia has tried to give more specific guidance in its choice of language in its ethical
rules. For its permissive provision the lawyer may only reveal "[i]nformation which clearly
establishes that his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated upon a third
party a fraud related to the subject matter of the representation." VA. CODE ANN., R.
SUP. Cr. VA. § II, VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3)
(Michie 1995) (emphasis added). One court has acknowledged that the phrase "clearly
establishes" sets a high standard for disclosure of client information involving fraud. See
X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("The voluntary nature of the
actual or potential disclosures and the absence of judicial scrutiny justify the higher 'clearly
establishes' standard for disclosure of purported evidence of ongoing or future fraud."),
afj'd sub nom. Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994). In Virginia's
mandatory provision requiring disclosure of a client's intention to commit a crime, the
lawyer is only under the provision's aegis if the client has actually stated the intent, and
is only required to disclose that stated intent after the lawyer has advised the client, where
feasible, "of the possible legal consequences of his action, urge[d] the client not to commit
the crime, and advise[d] the client that the attorney must reveal the client's criminal
intention unless thereupon abandoned." VA. CODE ANN., R. SUP. CT. VA. § II, VIRGINIA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(1) (Michie 1995).
81. See X Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1298 (granting employer-client's motion for injunction
to prevent employee-attorney's disclosure of confidential information).
82. See Sloan v. State Bar of Nev., 726 P.2d 330 (Nev. 1986) (denying the state bar
association's recommendation to suspend attorney from practice for, inter alia, failure to
disclose existence of a fraudulent transaction learned from a client).
83. One problem, however, is that while court opinions are fairly accessible, the
various jurisdictions' ethics opinions are far less so. For instance, only 14 states' ethics
opinions are currently available through Westlaw. See WESTLAW, LEGAL ETHICS AND
TEACHING WITH THE HYPOTHETICAL
Allowing or mandating attorneys to reveal a client's confidences
puts the profession on a slippery slope of having to be the judge of
which confidences are to be revealed and which are not. Now that
the profession has begun to assume the role of deciding when to make
disclosures in the first instance, without judicial scrutiny and without
clear guidelines, lawyers may become more and more comfortable
with this role change and with disclosure. Then the client will only
have the luck of the draw as to what moral standard or perspective of
the professional code's scope the lawyer selected will follow. And
given that the typical attorney begins the lawyer-client relationship by
giving the client assurances of confidentiality--or uses that assurance
if the client needs encouragement in discussing a sensitive prob-
lem 85 -the client will still be led to believe that confidences will be
PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, STATES ETHICS Ops. (directory). Other opinions are excerpted
in the biweekly issues of ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct. However,
it is unlikely that many lawyers have regular access to this publication. A jurisdiction may
maintain a hotline service to respond to questions by members of its bar; however, service
may not be quickly available. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CAL., ETHICS WATCH: KEEPING
AN EYE ON ETHICS, ETHICS HOTLINE SURVEY 2 (1992) (noting that "[tihe staff goal is
to return calls within 24 hours"). Further guidance on the scope of attorneys' discretion
under these disclosure provisions may not therefore be readily available to those in most
need of that assistance.
84. It must be emphasized that this role is far different than the lawyer's traditional
role of advocate. An attorney can be compelled pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege to reveal communications between the attorney and client
where those communications were sought to further a criminal scheme. See X Corp., 805
F. Supp. at 1306-07; 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 10, § 1.6:104. While the purpose
and effect of the crime-fraud exception and some of the disclosure provisions-especially
the rectification provisions-are similar, the means employed are very different. For
example, if a lawyer is called as a witness to testify concerning a client, the ethical
confidentiality obligation of the lawyer, as well as the attorney-client privilege, require the
lawyer to invoke the privilege-to remain silent. Thus, the lawyer will only reveal client
confidences if a court rules that the privilege is inapplicable. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt., para. 19. By contrast,'a lawyer's decision to reveal confidences
permitted by the various disclosure provisions is purely voluntary, not compelled, and not
subject to any oversight. See X Corp., 805 F. Supp. at 1309.
85. One book still in use for instruction of law students in interviewing techniques
suggests making the following statement concerning confidentiality as a motivation for
clients who are reluctant: "'Remember, whatever you tell me is strictly confidential. I
cannot and will not divulge anything you say to anyone else without your express permis-
sion."' DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 108 (1977). Even in a later version of the book, the
statement has only been slightly modified: "'Remember, unless you tell me you're
planning to rob a bank or something like that, everything you tell me is confidential. I
cannot and will not divulge anything you say without your express permission."' DAVID
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 241
(1991). A footnote at the end of that quote states: "'Hopefully, the humorous reference
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protected and will have no advance warning as to what standard of
disclosure the attorney will follow in interpreting the jurisdiction's
ethical rule. 6
Thus, while I conclude that the client in the hypothetical will
enjoy his attorney's maintaining of his confidences, I fear the overall
direction the profession is headed. The morass of confidentiality rules
promulgated since the ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983 has
significantly altered the role of the lawyer in our judicial system.
Moreover, these rules also lay serious traps for both lawyers87 and
clients. And in the case of the latter, the very professional who the
client believes will keep the client's interests uppermost has now
become the one who may cause the client's downfall. While some
may counter that clients cause their own downfall, it is inarguable that
these rules allow the client's own lawyer to give the push that starts
the client's public fall. When I was a law student, this was not the
understanding of a lawyer's role that I learned. I am not happy that
I must now instruct my students in this new kind of "lawyering." But
instruct I do, so that hopefully they will avoid the lawyer traps and
also so that hopefully they will know how to treat their clients with
candor and with the dignity and autonomy such candor accords, which
I believe is mandated in ethical provisions other than Model Rule 1.6.
to bank robbery allows you to suggest that the attorney-client privilege is not unlimited
while still providing motivation." Id. at 241 n.5 (citing Model Rule 1.6). Query whether
"the humorous reference" provides the client with sufficient information for the client
either to appreciate how limited the lawyer's confidentiality duty will be or to make an
informed decision about whether this attorney will meet the client's confidentiality needs.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.").
86. None of the ethics rules that permit or require disclosure suggest informing the
client at the time representation begins that such disclosure might occur. See supra notes
30, 32-33, 37-38, 40-44. Although Virginia's mandatory disclosure provision requires
advising the client of the lawyer's disclosure requirement, supra note 80 (discussing the
Virginia rule), it only requires this warning at the point an attorney will make disclosure,
not at the time of retention. For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of this issue, see
Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 441 (1989).
87. This is particularly true given the increasing amount of interstate practice engaged
in by attorneys who can then be held accountable under the ethical rules of both the
jurisdiction where they are members of the Bar, and the jurisdiction where the practice has
been performed. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 8.5; Committee on Counsel
Responsibility, Risk of Violation of Rules of Professional Responsibility by Reason of the
Increased Disparity Among the States, 45 BUS. LAW. 1229, 1233-34 (1990) (discussing the
differences in the ethical confidentiality rules between Florida and Delaware where an
attorney might be subject to both).
